National Planning in Iceland: Energy Development and Environmental Impacts by Couillard, Elizabeth
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Post-crash Iceland: opportunity, risk and reform Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-2011
National Planning in Iceland: Energy Development
and Environmental Impacts
Elizabeth Couillard
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v29
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Post-crash Iceland: opportunity, risk and reform by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Couillard, Elizabeth, "National Planning in Iceland: Energy Development and Environmental Impacts" (2011). Post-crash Iceland:
opportunity, risk and reform. Paper 5.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v29/5
Introduction
Within a short drive from Keflavík Inter-
national Airport, Iceland reveals its magnificent
environment. Steam rises from the landscape,
and waterfalls thunder over canyons.  It is just
what a visitor might expect of a country so
rich in natural resources.  A leader in renewable
energies, Iceland harnesses approximately 80
percent of its heating and electricity from
geothermal and hydropower energy sources.
(Gran)  However, Iceland has utilized only an
estimated 30 percent of the available energy
from its total hydropower and geothermal
potential. (Steingrímsson et al., p. 4)  As would
any country with an abundance of a natural
resource, Iceland has sought ways to use its
resources to draw in revenue.  Unable to phys-
ically export the country’s excess energy, Iceland
turned to foreign investment.  Landsvirkjun,
Iceland’s national power company founded to
utilize these energy resources to supply the
country with electricity, offered low energy
prices to foreign companies in power-inten-
sive industries, such as aluminum smelting.
(“Kárahnjúkar HEP…,” p. 1)  The construc-
tion of numerous power plants has fueled not
only these power intensive operations but also
widespread controversy.  The main challenge
entails finding a balance between expansion of
power production and conservation of the coun-
try’s natural resources.  Beginning in 1999, Ice-
land developed a mechanism to address this
challenge in its Master Plan for Hydropower and
Geothermal Development in Iceland, the sub-
ject of this article.  The Master Plan is currently
undergoing final preparations and the final res-
olution will be presented to the Icelandic par-
liament, Althingi, for discussion in late 2011.
Iceland’s Master Plan is a sound policy and, if
passed, would be instrumental in addressing this
challenge but must be adapted to changes in the
economy in order to continue to be effective
in the future.
A study of the shortcomings of the cur-
rent environmental policies reveals that energy
development decisions are not made from a
holistic standpoint. The Althingi first passed the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) leg-
islation in 1994.  An EIA is required for all
energy development projects; however, this
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assessment is often carried out at late stages
of the planning.  By the time the environmen-
tal consequences are carefully considered, large
investments have already been made in research
and preparation, making it more difficult to
effect changes. To counter this inherent limi-
tation, in 1997, the Icelandic government pro-
posed the development of a long-range energy
use plan.  The proposal for such a plan was
included in a broader governmental white paper
addressing sustainability in Iceland more gen-
erally. (Thórhallsdóttir, “Strategic Planning…,”
p. 549)  
The method developed to establish the Mas-
ter Plan addresses both environmental and eco-
nomic considerations, creating a healthy deci-
sion-making policy.  Had the Master Plan been
in place at the time of the approval and con-
struction of Iceland’s largest hydropower proj-
ect, Kárahnjúkar, there may have been a much
different outcome.  In addition to an examina-
tion of this case, a comparison with a similar
Norwegian plan already in place suggests the
benefits Iceland’s Master Plan could have for the
country as well as potential drawbacks for the
future.   An analysis of the Kárahnjúkar hydro-
electric project and the Norwegian plan ulti-
mately suggests that Iceland’s Master Plan
should be given timely legal status and careful
attention should be paid to future Master Plan
revisions, thereby allowing Iceland to make
the most informed and sustainable development
decisions.
The Master Plan
In 1999, the Ministry of Industry and the
Ministry for the Environment undertook the
creation of the Master Plan for Geothermal
and Hydropower Development in Iceland with
several defined objectives.  First, potential geot-
hermal and hydropower projects would be eval-
uated.  The sites of these projects would then be
classified with respect to energy capacity, eco-
nomic benefits, and regional, social, environ-
mental, cultural, and recreational conse-
quences.  Finally, taking into account these
considerations, the intention would be to rank
all potential energy projects. (Thórhallsdóttir,
“Strategic Planning…,” p. 549) A better under-
standing of the scope of scientific research
executed and range of experts involved in the
ranking method provides an evaluation of the
soundness of the Master Plan.
The first phase of the Master Plan began
in 1999 and lasted until 2003, evaluating the
development of 43 sites of interest: 19
hydropower and 24 geothermal.  The
hydropower projects selected included the ones
with the highest capacity and most evident eco-
nomic benefits, and the geothermal projects
included those at the most accessible sites.
Headed by the Ministry of Industry and the Min-
istry for the Environment, a 17-person steering
committee was appointed. The committee
included directors from the two ministries
and other key institutions, including the Nature
Conservation Agency, the National Energy
Authority, the Institute of Natural History,
and representatives from NGOs and local gov-
ernments.  Also joining the steering committee
were chairpersons for each of four workgroups.
Workgroup I, the primary focus of this analy-
sis (discussed later in detail), was concerned
with environmental impacts and cultural her-
itage, while Workgroup II focused on recreation
and land use, Workgroup III on regional and
economic consequences, and Workgroup IV
on energy capacity and project costs of vari-
ous alternatives. The steering committee mem-
bers were invited to nominate additional indi-
viduals to the four groups, which would carry
out the detailed work creating the Master Plan.
(Thórhallsdóttir, “Environment and Energy…,”
pp. 526-27)  The methods and findings of Work-
groups II, III, and IV are not examined in detail
in this article.  Although it is important to
note their purpose and contribution to the final
ranking, the primary intent is to understand Ice-
land’s evaluation of the environmental aspects
of energy planning.
Workgroup I, chaired by Dr. Th. E.
Thórhallsdóttir, a botanist and professor at the
University of Iceland, consisted of 13 experts
in various fields. (Steingrímsson et al., p. 6)
Among them were representatives from the Uni-
versity of Iceland, Institutes of National History
and Freshwater Fisheries, the National Museum,
the National Conservation Agency, National
Conservation Council, the Icelandic Association
of Architects, and NGOs. (Thórhallsdóttir, “Envi-
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ronment and Energy…,” p. 526)  Once Work-
group I had defined their approach, the proj-
ect evaluation process began.  The group
decided to separately evaluate the value of
each site and the impact an energy development
project would have on the site.  To achieve
this, an evaluation matrix that could be used for
both value and impact was defined.  The matrix
divided the group’s focus into classes: geodiver-
sity and hydrology, species, biodiversity and
soils, landscape and wilderness, and cultural
heritage. Some classes were further divided into
subclasses.  A series of attributes were consid-
ered for each class or subclass: richness and
diversity; rarity; size, completeness, and frag-
mentation; information and symbolic values;
international responsibility; and visual value.
Table 1 illustrates the evaluation matrix.  The
first three columns list the classes with their
overall weight and subclasses.  The next six
columns list each attribute and its correspon-
ding assigned weight, ranging from zero to 1,
within each class or subclass.  Not all attributes
weighed into the evaluation of each class.
(Thórhallsdóttir, “Strategic Planning…,” pp.
551-55)  To score each project, a team of spe-
cialists for each class would recommend attrib-
ute scores for that particular class, which in
turn would be weighted according to the values
in Table 1. Once the expert recommendations
were considered and discussed, each group
member voted anonymously.  The resulting
scores for each class were weighted to reach a
final, overall score for both value and impact,
for each project. (Thórhallsdóttir, “Environment
and Energy…,” p. 530)  After evaluating each
site according to the matrix, other special
considerations were taken into account in the
project ranking.  Any special features or excep-
tionally high scores in a particular area were
listed.  This distinguished those sites with scores
consisting of average values for each category
and those consisting of scores with an extreme
value in one area and lower values in the other
areas.  Also, a degree of risk and uncertainty was
assigned to each potential project to distinguish
projects lacking in scientific data or knowl-
edge of cumulative or higher order impacts.
(Thórhallsdóttir, “Strategic Planning…,” p. 558)
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Table 1
Project Site Evaluation Matrix
Source: Thórhallsdóttir, “Strategic Planning…,” pp. 553-54, and supplemented with information in the text.
The phase I results from Workgroup I along
with the results of the other workgroups were
compiled to create a final ranking of the 43 proj-
ect sites.  The Steering Committee analyzed the
findings of all four groups and determined a
method of ranking the projects using three
indices: environmental impact, total profit, and
rate of return.  The environmental impact index
(Index U) was based on the results of Work-
groups I and II, with data from group I weighted
double against group II. Both the total profit
index (Index H) and the rate of return index
(Index A) were based on the results from Work-
group IV.  Each index was divided into five
groups, ranging from a group containing the
best sites (i.e. those sites with the lowest Index
U numbers or the sites with the highest Index
H or A numbers) to a group constituting the
worst sites (i.e. those with the highest U Index
or the lowest H or A indices). (Steingrímsson et
al., p. 9) The indices allowed the projects to be
compared graphically and the Steering Commit-
tee to make quantitative suggestions on which
projects should be undertaken. (Hreinsson, p. 5)
Phase II of the Master Plan consisted of
two parts.  The first, from 2004 to 2007, served
as a research stage. (Master Plan...)  One objec-
tive was to study unexplored geothermal sites
in the central highlands in order to develop a
better methodology for their assessment.  Then
those, along with the geothermal sites evaluated
in the first phase, could be better evaluated
and compared.  A second objective was to fur-
ther develop a method for evaluating landscape,
one of the classes only preliminarily evaluated
in Workgroup I in the first phase.  A third objec-
tive was to evaluate possibilities for mini hydro
stations, the potential of which was unknown.
(Steingrímsson et al., p. 10)  A digital runoff
model was created as part of the information
gathering process, but it was soon realized
that consideration of small and mini hydro
options in the ranking would cost too much
in time and resources. (Barðadóttir)  The sec-
ond part of phase II, beginning in 2007, com-
pleted the evaluation process begun in phase
I. (Master Plan...) This final evaluation included
the most updated, recently gathered informa-
tion as well as all newly identified projects and
any modifications to projects since the first eval-
uation in phase I. (Steingrímsson et al., p. 10)
It was anticipated that the Master Plan would
rank approximately 100 projects by the end of
phase II.  (Steingrímsson et al., p. 1) The final
ranking by the four Workgroups was completed
in July 2011. (Barðadóttir)
Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project
Thus, with an understanding of the Mas-
ter Plan process, an analysis of the Kárahnjúkar
Hydropower Project, completed in 2009, reveals
the project’s controversial aspects and sug-
gests a need for the Master Plan to prevent such
arguably shortsighted projects. Landsvirkjun
completed an Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in 2001 for the project, which at the
time was being evaluated as part of a compar-
ative process by the Master Plan.  However,
the Master Plan’s evaluation was not completed
until after the decision to proceed with the proj-
ect was made.  The Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric
Project became Iceland’s most controversial
hydropower development primarily due to the
massive scale of its adverse environmental
impact.  It is the largest hydropower plant in
Iceland, and the majority of the electricity
generated powers Alcoa’s 322,000-ton Fjarðaál
aluminum smelter. (Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric
Project. “Large Scale Industry…”) The Kárah-
njúkar plant harnesses energy from two gla-
cial rivers, Jökulsá í Fljótsdal and Jökulsá á Dal,
which originate from the Vatnajökull ice cap
in the central highlands in East Iceland.  Con-
sisting of three reservoirs (the largest with an
area of 57 km2), five dams, and one power-
house all connected by numerous channels and
tunnels, the project has an installed capacity
of 690 MW and generates 4,500 GWh of electric-
ity per year.1 (“Kárahnjúkar HEP…,” pp. 1-2)
The results from Landsvirkjun’s 2001 EIA
indicated detrimental effects to the area, and led
to serious questions regarding the sustainabil-
ity of the project.  The report concluded that the
plant’s construction would submerge a total
of 66 km2, 37 km2 of which are covered with veg-
etation of high conservation value.  Negative
1 A megawatt (MW) is a unit of power equivalent to
106 joules per second. An installed capacity of 690 MW
means that at full capacity the hydropower plant is pro-
ducing that number of MW at any given time.  By con-
verting MW to gigawatts (GW) and multiplying by the num-
ber of hours in a year (8,760), the annual generating capacity
of the plant, operating at 100 percent, is obtained in
gigawatt-hours (GWh).  A GWh is a unit of energy output.
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effects on the landscape include a 925-km2
reduction in open space replaced with buildings
and dams, the tallest of which would be 190 m
high. ("Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric Project Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment," p. 93)  The
development would have an impact on a total
area of 2,900 km2, three percent of Iceland’s
land. About 60 waterfalls and unique geological
formations would be submerged or destroyed by
river diversions, groundwater levels would be
affected, and the reservoir’s vacillating water lev-
els would create a mud zone along its rim that
would dry and erode in Iceland’s frequent winds.
The development would have a negative impact
on Iceland’s pink-footed geese and several
species of migratory fish and possibly cause
the local extinction of reindeer using the region
for breeding and grazing. The decreased sedi-
ment carried to the mouth of the rivers would
cause the erosion of the shoreline and have an
impact on several bird species and the already
struggling harbor seal population. (Bosshard,
pp. 3-4)  Despite obvious environmental threats,
the question of whether or not the economic
benefits would outweigh the consequences
was still up for heated debate.
The building of the Kárahnjúkar dam
promised attractive economic benefits and con-
tributions to the long-term economic health
of the region in exchange for the environmen-
tal losses. (World Business Council..., p. 3)
The aluminum smelter operation in East Ice-
land would require a staff of approximately 400,
and the jobs created in the region would total
an estimated 800, spurring economic activity
and growth in the area.  An increase of 1,600
to 1,800 residents was expected.  Hundreds of
new homes would be built, and the municipal
revenue of the region would significantly
increase. (World Business Council..., p. 6)  These
projected economic benefits won over many
East Icelanders.
Although the Kárahnjúkar project faced
strong opposition every step of the way, the proj-
ect was eventually approved and constructed.
Initially, on August 1, 2001, the Icelandic Plan-
ning Agency ruled against the Kárahnjúkar proj-
ect due to its high, irreversible environmental
consequences and uncertain economic benefits.
(Thors and Theodórsdóttir)  Shortly after,
Landsvirkjun, the Regional Association of Local
Authorities in Eastern Iceland, East Iceland
labor organizations, and individuals in the
region where the aluminum smelter would be
built appealed the decision of the Planning
Agency to the Minister of the Environment, pro-
viding further research and possible mitiga-
tion measures.   On December 20, 2001, the
Minister of the Environment overruled the Plan-
ning Agency’s decision in favor of the Kárahn-
júkar Dam with a number of requested changes.
(Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric Project, “Minister
for the Environment...”)   In 2002, Althingi
approved the damming of the two rivers and,
after Alcoa signed a 40-year contract with
Landsvirkjun in March 2003, construction
began. (Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric Project,
“The Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project
Overview”)  
Although the first phase of the Master
Plan for Hydropower and Geothermal Energy
Resources was not expected to be complete until
2003, an interim report was supposed to influ-
ence the parliamentary discussions on the
Kárahnjúkar project.  However, this interim
report, which was nearly ready during the dis-
cussions, was not released until after the deci-
sion to move forward with the project was made.
The Master Plan indicated that of the 15 proj-
ects analyzed at that point, the Kárahnjúkar
Hydropower Project was the least acceptable,
considering effect on natural value, and the
third least acceptable when environmental
impact and effect on natural value were both
considered. (Bosshard, p. 5)  Furthermore, the
Plan concluded that it was not one of the most
economical projects, suggesting strong politi-
cal motivations for the project. (Bosshard, p. 11)
Today, it is still not clear if building the
Kárahnjúkar project was a wise decision for
there are indications that the project is not envi-
ronmentally sustainable.  One concern stems
from global warming.  The Vatnajökull ice
cap, which feeds the rivers for the Kárahn-
júkar plant, is expected to melt away over the
next 200 years.  As the glacier melts faster, the
rivers carry increasing amounts of sediment
into the reservoir, reducing its size and produc-
tion capacity. (Smith)  Similar to many other
large dams, the lifespan of the plant is projected
to be only 50 to 80 years because of the high lev-
els of sediment transported in the glacial rivers.
Even worse, this serious concern fails to take
into account glacial surges, which is when a gla-
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cier moves at a much greater velocity than
usual. This can cause flooding and greatly
increased sediment in the river and further
reduce the lifespan of the project.  The last surge
occurred in 1963, and it is estimated that there
will be another within the next 30 years.
(BirdLife International et al., p. 9)  
There is also indication that the eco-
nomic benefits might not flow as promised.
During the preliminary phases of the Kárahn-
júkar project, Thorsteinn Siglaugsson, an Ice-
landic economist, independently evaluated the
project for the Iceland Nature Conservation
Association.  Using slightly less optimistic price
trends for aluminum and the cost of electric-
ity, Siglaugsson concluded an average annual
loss of $36 million for the project. (Bosshard, p.
10)  Since the project’s completion, Andrew
Smith reported in his video for the Washing-
ton Post that Kárahnjúkar is not bringing in
profit as expected. At the completion of the proj-
ect, the price of aluminum had significantly
dropped and, as originally stipulated by the con-
tract between Landsvirkjun and Alcoa, energy
prices were directly linked to aluminum prices.
This changed when a new contract, effective
October 2010, was signed by Landsvirkjun and
Alcoa decoupling the energy and aluminum
prices. (“Landsvirkjun and Alcan…”) Many
houses built for the expected increase in pop-
ulation in East Iceland stand unsold in the
still unfulfilled hope for an economic boom that
would repay the country’s investment in the
project.2 (Smith)  
The Kárahnjúkar dam case suggests that
although economic stimulation in East Ice-
land would be welcomed, the project ultimately
may have been shortsighted.  During the first
years of the project’s operation, the promised
economic benefits have not materialized.  Addi-
tionally, although they have yet to be fully
evaluated, the environmental costs are expected
to be great.  In 2004, Alcoa and Landsvirkjun
launched a Sustainability Initiative.  This pilot
project created a set of indicators to monitor
economic, social, and environmental changes
in East Iceland as a result of the Kárahnjúkar
project.  The first findings from 2007 to 2010
were released in 2011, the beginning of a long-
term monitoring effort (Sustainability Initia-
tive).  The project's construction suggests that
the current assessment process for the develop-
ment of an energy site has shortcomings. Ice-
land’s Master Plan is intended to prevent such
shortsighted decisions.  Whether, and further-
more, how the Master Plan might have affected
the outcome of the Kárahnjúkar case and in
turn will affect future energy development proj-
ects is still not clear, at least as long as the
Plan is mired in the limbo of parliamentary
approval.
Norway as an Example
Some insight into Iceland's planning out-
comes and projections can be gleaned from an
examination of Iceland’s Nordic neighbor,
Norway, whose similar planning efforts can pro-
vide experience that can help Iceland succeed.
The 1984 Norwegian Master Plan for Water
Resources, the Icelandic Master Plan’s only iden-
tified equivalent, creates a policy for sustainable
use of natural resources at a national level.  The
Master Plan for Geothermal and Hydropower
Development in Iceland was originally modeled
after the Norwegian Plan; however, the two have
notable differences.  The Norwegian Plan
includes a comparison of watercourses, unlike
the Icelandic plan, which was based solely on
individual energy development projects: both
geothermal power and hydropower.  Although
the status of the Icelandic Master Plan as a legal
document remains uncertain, the Norwegian
Master Plan was approved by its Parliament,
Storting, and has influenced the development
of hydropower in Norway. (Thórhallsdóttir,
“Strategic Planning…,” p. 559) 
In postwar Norway, an influx of license
applications for hydropower developments
had politicians overwhelmed. Some sort of com-
prehensive plan to help officials determine
which licenses would be granted was needed.  In
1960, Norway took its first steps to create such
a plan.  The result, however, was not the devel-
opment plan for hydropower the officials
sought, but a Protection Plan for Watercourses,
focusing on which watercourses to protect
rather than which hydropower sites to develop.
In 1973, Storting passed Protection Plan I,
and subsequent revisions followed over the
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2 For a more detailed exploration of the aluminum
industry in Iceland, see Daniel Grande’s article in this vol-
ume
decades.  The plan gave political protection from
hydropower development to certain individual
lakes, rivers, and waterfalls representative of the
region and varying in size and location. (The
Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, pp.
99-101)  However, conflict between hydropower
development and other user interests in the
watercourses, such as environmental conserva-
tion and outdoor recreation groups, contin-
ued to grow, and a comprehensive plan for the
development of remaining watercourses for
hydropower was still needed. (Halvorsen, p. 40)
By 1980, approximately 60 percent, 174
TWh, of the potential hydropower in Norway
had been harnessed. (Halvorsen, p. 39)  An addi-
tional 10 TWh would be required to meet the
energy demand forecasted for 2000. (Wenstop
and Carlsen, p. 37)  Although each hydropower
development project was evaluated for impacts
on an individual basis, no planning strategy at
a national level had previously been coordinated.
(Halvorsen, p. 39)  In the early 1980s, the Stort-
ing asked the government for a master plan that
would set priorities for future hydropower devel-
opment based on economic effects and antici-
pated conflict between user interests.  This proj-
ect, the Master Plan for the Management of
Watercourses in Norway, was headed by the Min-
istry for the Environment, closely assisted by
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Admin-
istration. (Wenstop and Carlsen, p. 37)  The
objective was to create valuable documentation
in water management planning that would set
political priorities and provide information on
which projects should be considered for a
license when development was required.
(Halvorsen, p. 45)  
The plan evaluated 310 watercourses and
a total of 542 alternatives. (Thórhallsdóttir,
“Strategic Planning…,”p. 559)  The project
alternatives were classified by economy, cost per
GWh, impact, and effect on other user interests.
(Halvorsen, pp. 44-45)   The majority of these
user interests are considered in one of the
four workgroups in the Icelandic Plan.
(Thórhallsdóttir, “Strategic Planning…,”p. 560)
The interests were hydropower, nature con-
servation, outdoor recreation, wildlife, fishing,
water supply, protection against water pollution,
preservation of ancient monuments, agriculture
and forestry, reindeer cultivation, prevention of
flooding and erosion, transport, formation of ice
and the temperature of water, climate, mapping
and data, and regional economy.  Each inter-
est was given a number on a scale indicating
degree of positive or negative impact.
(Halvorsen, p. 40)  The projects were then
grouped and sorted based on impact and econ-
omy. (Halvorsen, p. 44)  
The Master Plan was first presented to the
Storting in 1985 and approved.  It has been
updated a few times since then, including in
1993, the same year the Storting accepted the
final Protection Plan.  Projects in Category 1
were under consideration for development
licenses. However, a project placed in Cate-
gory 1 does not require the authorities to issue
the license but only commits them to process
the application.  Projects in Category 2 were not
being considered for development at that time,
and authorities could postpone the processing
of the application.  Until 1993, Category 3
included projects possessing the highest
expected level of environmental impact. After
passage of Protection Plan IV, protecting 341
watercourses, projects in Category 3 locations
that were not already covered by the Protec-
tion Plan were added to Category 2. (The Nor-
wegian Institute for Nature Research, pp. 101-
102)  
In 2000, the Norwegian Institute for Nature
Research and the Eastern Norway Research
Institute published a case study report on the
Glomma and Laagen River Basin in Norway
for the World Commission on Dams knowl-
edge base.  The report analyzes the proposed
development of the Upper Otta River and its
tributaries, an applicant for a development
license during the years the Master Plan was
introduced.  Since the 1970s, The Glommens
and Laagens Water Management Association
and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate had struggled against environ-
mental interests to develop two large reservoirs
and an associated power plant, which would
allow them to harness more energy in the Upper
Otta River in the winter season during peak
demand.  By 1984, the Master Plan had assessed
the range of existing site possibilities in the
Glomma and Laagen Basin and placed two
possible power plant locations on the Upper Otta
River in Category 1.  These two locations, then
referred to as the Upper Otta project, were of
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lower power potential than the original plans.
By the time the Master Plan and the Protec-
tion Plan were updated in 1993, the license
application for the Upper Otta project had still
not been submitted, and a considerable por-
tion of the watercourses included in the project
plans had been protected, decreasing the poten-
tial power by approximately two-thirds. (The
Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, pp.
107-109)   The Upper Otta project continued
to face political and environmental objection;
however, the size of the project, now much
reduced, had been greatly influenced by the exis-
tence of the Master Plan and Protection Plan,
thereby suggesting their value in terms of iden-
tifying and protecting watercourses of value to
other user interest groups.
Balancing Development and Protection
Norway’s energy situation makes clear
that both development and protection
approaches are needed.  Given Norway’s future
energy requirements, it was essential to know
which watercourses should be developed to
meet those needs, yet it was also crucial to iden-
tify watercourses that should be protected for
other interests.  Iceland needs to approach land
use planning in a similar way.  Iceland’s clean
energy exports through heavy industry are cur-
rently expanding and likely to expand even
further.  Knowing which projects will cause the
least environmental impact and have the most
economic benefits is thus important.  Because
nature tourism is also a large part of Iceland’s
economy, choosing sites for protection is essen-
tial for that sector.   
Iceland is using an approach similar to Nor-
way’s to balance development and protection.
Norway placed watercourses and alternatives in
one of three categories: the first for possible
development projects, the second for projects to
research further and save for future needs,
and the third for watercourses to protect.  In
Iceland’s bill for the Master Plan, potential proj-
ects are placed into three similar categories.
(Barðadóttir)  Looking back on the development
of Kárahnjúkar, it can be argued that the proj-
ect was perhaps shortsighted.  It cannot be
known with certainty if the Kárahnjúkar dam
would have been built had the Master Plan been
completed and in place at the time. However,
the government would have been obligated to
utilize the Plan's recommendations.  Having
been in the top three for highest environmen-
tal impact and not among the best for economic
gains after the first phase, it is likely that the
Master Plan would have placed Kárahnjúkar
in the third category for protection, resulting in
the development of an alternative site to power
Alcoa Fjarðaál or to the selection of another
location for the new smelter.
Future Considerations
Although the Icelandic Master Plan is a
stride toward sustainable land planning, it is
only a tool.  The fate of each hydropower and
geothermal site is still in the hands of the pol-
icy makers.  With power-intensive industry
eager to take advantage of the cheap, clean
energy, Iceland should take careful considera-
tion as to how easily projects can be moved
between categories in the future.  If rapid energy
development in Iceland depleted the number of
projects available for licenses, further develop-
ment would require projects originally desig-
nated to be protected or saved for further
research to be moved to the development cat-
egory.  This would pose a challenging decision
for Iceland in future revisions of the Master
Plan.
Landsvirkjun, HS Orka, and Reykjavík
Energy, Iceland’s main energy companies,
have a combined 27 planned power plants at var-
ious stages to begin operation though 2017.
These 27 power plants would add 1660 MW of
electricity in Iceland, increasing generation by
64 percent. The reason for this anticipated
capacity growth is the large number of projected
industrial projects, including aluminum
smelters, silicon production plants, data stor-
age centers, paper production plants, and car-
bon fiber plants scheduled to begin operation by
2016.   These industrial projects range from
those currently under construction to those
in planning stages.  If all projects go through,
they will require a total of 1,600 MW of electric-
ity by 2016. (Íslandsbanki’s Sustainable Energy
Team, pp. 22-23)
Iceland’s Master Plan evaluates projects pro-
posed by Iceland’s energy companies. (Stein-
grímsson et al., p. 60)  Usually only one project,
but in some cases two possible projects, was
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evaluated for the same site. (Hreinsson, p. 3)
Iceland may thus be limiting the development
possibilities for a site by restricting analysis to
individual project proposals.  In the case of Nor-
way, the project in the Upper Otta River had
to be downsized because particular watercourses
included in the project had been protected.  The
Icelandic Master Plan could not do this, giving
it an all-or-nothing approach for each site.   In
the future, Iceland may find its economy shift-
ing away from power-intensive industries and
discover the need to investigate the develop-
ment of smaller parts of hydropower or geother-
mal sites currently encompassed by larger
proposed projects.  It is already planned that,
if passed, the Master Plan will be updated every
four to six years as new research becomes avail-
able. (Tómasson)  Not only will Icelanders
need to update the scientific information used
in the Master Plan but also they must be willing
to adapt their Plan to future energy needs to
avoid developing larger projects than necessary
simply because they were evaluated by the Mas-
ter Plan.
Conclusion
Ideally, Iceland’s Master Plan will simulta-
neously advance both energy development and
environmental protection policies.  It will pro-
vide Iceland’s government a decision-making
tool that gives user interests other than energy
companies an official say, backed by scientific
research, in the fate of Iceland’s resources.  The
database of information about specific projects
relative to other options will alleviate depend-
ence on expensive environmental impact assess-
ments that fail to see a project’s true impact
in the grand scheme of development.  
The bill for the Master Plan, describing three
categories into which the proposed projects
would be sorted, was first presented to the
Althingi, but not discussed, in the winter of
2009.  It was presented a second time in autumn
2010 and passed in May 2011.   Shortly after,
in July 2011, a report from the four Workgroups
gave the final ranking of the proposed proj-
ects.  The Ministry for the Environment and the
Ministry of Industry are currently working on a
resolution that will present this final ranking in
three categories according to the law passed
in May.  A 12-week public hearing will follow,
and the final resolution will be presented to Par-
liament in late 2011. (Barðadóttir) With so many
projects in the planning stages, it is important
that Iceland give the Master Plan legal status
and put it to work as soon as possible.  The Mas-
ter Plan will steer Iceland away from short-
sighted developments, benefiting future gen-
erations.
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